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:is article takes up Rorty’s advice to feminists to abandon philosophizing (and 
appeals to truth and reality) in favor of using language to create a new logical 
space for feminist politics.  :e argument focuses on the rhetorical role of appeals 
to truth and reality, the role of linguistic innovation in social change, and the 
feminist critique of Rorty’s use of the “prophetic voice” in his discussion of feminist 
politics. 
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Este artículo retoma el llamado que hace Rorty a lo(a)s feministas para que abando-
nen la ;losofía (y la apelación a la verdad y a la realidad) a favor de una utilización 
del lenguaje que cree un nuevo espacio lógico para la política feminista. El argu-
mento se concentra en el papel retórico del llamado a la verdad y a la realidad, el 
papel de la innovación lingüística en el cambio social, y la crítica feminista del uso 
que hace Rorty de la “voz profética” en su discusión de las políticas feministas. 
Palabras clave: Rorty, feminismo, retórica, realismo, profecía. 
I began work on the volume Feminist Interpretations of Richard 
Rorty mostly out of a curious desire to defend him, since it seemed 
to me that all the feminists I know who had read Rorty were highly 
critical of him. Not that I agreed with him, but I did think that his 
positions had, to a large extent, been fundamentally misunderstood. 
And the more time I invested in reading his works on feminism, 
then on political theory, then on literature and philosophy, the more 
I came to see his points, really, even if I still had niggling doubts 
about where he ended up.
His discussion of feminism and feminist philosophy is con-
nected rather seamlessly with his general position with respect to 
philosophy –that is, one cannot understand his claims about femi-
nism without understanding his critique of philosophy and his allied
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position with respect to philosophy’s “others”: rhetoric, poetry, and pol-
itics. And while there are many issues that appear on the radar screen 
when I think about the ways that Rorty has animated feminist philo-
sophical discussions, in this I will focus on the issue that has, perhaps, 
been the most controversial: the issue of the “prophetic voice”. I begin 
with three stories about feminism, philosophy, and social activism that 
I gathered during the course of putting together the book.
I was eager to learn what had drawn him to feminist philoso-
phy, especially considering the fact that he had already become the 
bête noire of analytic philosophy by the time he delivered his Tanner 
Lecture, “Feminism and Pragmatism” at the University of Michigan 
in 1980. When I asked his wife, Mary Varney Rorty, she told me that it 
seemed to be an organic development: he was a voracious reader, and 
he was a social activist who came from a long line of social activists 
and women we might now think of as proto-feminists:
Richard’s mother was an ABD sociologist; his aunt Elizabeth 
Brandeis Raushenbush was an economics professor; his aunt Esther 
Raushenbush was president of Sarah Lawrence, his aunt Joan 
Raushenbush was a powerful political advisor and policy wonk in the 
Roosevelt and Truman administrations; […] A great-aunt […] wrote 
a two volume work on WollstonecraF. (Rorty, M.V. 2008)
But his interest in feminism was not necessarily an interest in 
feminist theory; his preferred authors, to whom he paid great atten-
tion, and who ;gure prominently in his discussion of feminism, 
were Marilyn Frye, Adrienne Rich, and Catherine MacKinnon. 
Mary Rorty conjectures that he gravitated toward them because of 
their ability to use language in a way that Rorty admired:
Looking back now on the course his intellectual development was 
taking, it is easy to see why he picked who he did. He was not par-
ticularly interested in technicians, per se, although he spent lots of his 
professional career mud-wrestling with them. He was increasingly 
anti-theory. His daddy was a poet. He thought of language as best 
used to do something –as best used to bring about social change, to 
eliminate inequalities. He had known and admired Marilyn Frye for 
years, so she was an easy choice –and she writes like a dream. Frye 
and Rich were in the ‘70s (and still, for all I know) staples of intro 
women’s studies courses because they grabbed you by the brain and 
imagination and rammed you into something you might not have 
thought about but sure were gonna think about now. […] [T]hat kind 
of writing –writing that clears a path for ideas, preferably outrageous 
ones, to wham into your brain– was Rorty’s meat. He aspired to it; he 
recognized it when he saw it; he absolutely respected it. He was glad 
of an occasion to acknowledge it. (Rorty, M.V. 2008) 
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:e third anecdote pre-dates these. I had just proposed the volume 
to Penn State University Press when Rorty came to my institution, 
Hamilton College, to deliver our Truax lectures in 2003. When asked 
by students in my seminar on Mind and Body what they should be 
doing instead of philosophy (their attempts to engage him in discus-
sion of issues he raised in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature fell 
Iat), his answer to them was “art and politics”. When asked by one 
rather distraught student, who was beginning to fear that she had 
wasted four years of education by majoring in philosophy, what he 
thought the value of philosophy was, if there was any, he told the 
students that philosophers were just people who had read certain 
books, and those books are diJerent from the books that people 
in literature departments had read. When I asked him, during that 
same visit, if there was anything he missed about being in a philos-
ophy department, he told me that he would like to teach a seminar 
on the work of Robert Brandom, but that the graduate students 
in his Comparative Literature department would not have enough 
philosophical background to understand that work. 
:ese stories illustrate that Rorty’s own relationship to the 
philosophical canon, and the discipline of philosophy, is as fraught 
and full of tensions as it is for most feminist philosophers. On one 
hand, we ;nd great value in reading “the philosophical canon”, and 
in learning the particular kinds of thinking skills that philosophy 
teaches; but we also recognize that the canon is the canon in virtue 
of certain kinds of exclusions, in virtue of a particular, dominant 
story about what philosophy really is, and what distinguishes it 
from other disciplines. :is story seems to exclude feminism and 
feminist theory, with its explicit connection to political ideals, from 
that canon. More broad-minded philosophers might be willing to 
entertain the possibility that feminist theory might have a place in 
the canons of political philosophy and ethics, but even in these cases, 
the feminist authors included usually constitute a very small sample. 
:e lines drawn between philosophy and non-philosophy oFen re-
Iect a commitment to a story of philosophy in which philosophers 
are concerned with rationality, truth, and universalism and the 
questions that arise from those commitments. But, Rorty insisted, 
those problems are dead, or pointless: the only place for philosophers 
now is as a set of people who think that reading a certain canon is 
valuable. Philosophers are not philosophers in virtue of pursuing a 
common set of problems, but rather in virtue of owning and reading 
a common set of books.
But then, where does this leave feminist philosophers? If what 
it is to be a philosopher is to own and read a certain collection of 
books –the philosophical canon– then as feminists seek to contest 
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that canon, they seem to place themselves outside of philosophy. To 
this, Rorty would say, “yes, and so much the better for feminism”.
Rorty, having given up the problems of epistemology and 
metaphysics, took up the issue of social change, and as a result saw 
himself as having leF the arena of philosophy. But he did not think 
that this was something to be mourned, nor that it was something to 
be regretted. Rather, he claimed that philosophy can do nothing to 
bring about social change. He believed that only art and politics are 
capable of bringing about the kind of progressive social change that 
he cared most about, and his move to departments of humanities 
and comparative literature were a material expression of this intellec-
tual position. And yet, in spite of this move, he still missed something 
about philosophy. :e tension between valuing philosophy while at 
the same time seeing the discipline as the product of the exclusion 
of certain kinds of questions and concerns is, I would argue, a ten-
sion that feminist philosophers experience in their own struggles 
within and against the discipline, and the issue of the philosophical 
canon is oFen the site of these struggles. While some feminists deal 
with this tension by trying to rede;ne the discipline, some take the 
Rorty route, leaving the discipline behind or, in some cases, arguing 
that philosophy is itself, and will continue to be, a support system 
for an ideology of patriarchy.
In addition to his unusual relationship to the discipline of 
philosophy, what distinguishes Rorty from the other giants of late 
twentieth century Anglo-American (analytic) philosophy is his in-
terest in, and serious engagement with, feminist theory. In many ways, 
Rorty would seem to be a natural ally for feminists. His critique of the 
metaphor of mind as mirror, presented in Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature and his insistence that such metaphors have theoretical 
consequences, carrying signi;cant philosophical content, ;ts well 
with feminist discussions of the use of metaphors in the history 
of philosophy and science.1 Rorty and feminist historians of phi-
losophy have argued that, rather than being mere ornamentation, 
metaphors actually encode philosophical assumptions, and that as 
such they are central to the way that philosophers have come to 
understand concepts like ‘knowledge’, ‘reality’, and ‘rationality’.
 In addition, Rorty’s attack on the premises and assumptions en-
coded in the metaphor of mind as mirror seems to support, at least 
implicitly, feminist attempts to critique the assumptions about the 
mind that go unexamined in contemporary epistemology: the as-
sumption that the identity of knowers is irrelevant, that knowledge is 
mostly an individualistic aJair, and that our best model of knowl-
edge will come out of an examination of the cases in which an 
individual knower comes to know a simple empirical claim, such 
1 See, for instance, Lloyd’s (1993) classic contribution to this literature.
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as “I see a tree”.2 :ese assumptions, paired with the privileging of 
scienti;c discourse, marginalized realms of knowledge that might 
be expected to be more accessible to, or even central to, women’s 
epistemic lives, feminist epistemologists argued. Rorty’s attempt 
to dismiss the traditional problems of philosophy as being use-
less seems to support the feminist drive to address “real world” 
epistemic problems, rather than highly abstract constructions of 
epistemic situations. :en Rorty explicitly took up the feminist 
cause, however, and argued that feminists did not really gain any-
thing from philosophical theory, from deconstruction, or from a 
realist commitment to truth and undistorted representation, many 
feminist philosophers found themselves thinking that friends like 
Rorty might be more of a hindrance than a help.
Feminists make a mistake, Rorty argues, when they try to use 
the universalist and realist language characteristic of claims on be-
half of women that appeal to the idea of universal human rights, 
or when they try to phrase their arguments in terms of a critique 
of ideological distortion. Rorty argues that pragmatism is a more 
promising alliance for feminists than are universalist or realist 
positions, because pragmatism can recognize the idea of moral 
progress as evolutionary without assuming that such progress is 
best explained as an approach toward a less distorted or truer pic-
ture of the world. Rorty urges feminists to give up these appeals 
to realism and universalism in favor of a pragmatist, prophetic 
feminism that eschews traditional philosophical theorizing and 
embraces instead a strategy of linguistic innovation. According to 
Rorty, feminists need linguistic innovation and new visions to oJer as 
alternatives to the present state of aJairs, in comparison with which 
these new visions can oJer more hope and better alternatives. We see 
in this move Rorty’s debt to Kuhn’s analysis of scienti;c revolutions: 
just as a scienti;c theory or paradigm cannot be overthrown in the 
absence of a new one to take its place, so social “paradigms” can-
not be overthrown in the absence of new social visions. Feminists 
should not tie themselves to the old paradigm by playing by its 
rules of argumentation and evidence, but should take on the chal-
lenge of providing a new paradigm, even at the risk of sounding 
crazy or having their appeals fall on deaf ears. Only by oJering a 
new vision that could replace the old model of patriarchy –a func-
tion ful;lled by prophecy, not by philosophy– can feminists make 
progress.
Rorty’s emphasis on the value and importance of a “linguistic 
community” in which such appeals can ;nd listeners and uptake 
sits uneasily with his valorization of prophecy, however, according 
to Nancy Fraser. Fraser argues that the model of prophecy and the 
2 Code (1993) refers to this model as the “S knows that p” model of knowledge.
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propethic voice seems to assume that strong and visionary individ-
uals, rather than linguistic communities, are the primary motors 
of change. Fraser’s response to Rorty’s Tanner Lecture argues that 
Rorty’s understanding of the dynamics of political communities 
tends to encourage an individualistic vision of the role of femi-
nist redescription. Fraser argues that Rorty’s model of the strong 
poet or aesthete, found in his non-feminist political writings, is 
transformed in his Tanner Lecture into the model of the feminist 
prophet, and she sees this as a major and welcome shiF in his work. 
Yet, the band of feminist separatists “huddled together spinning a 
web of words as a charm to keep from going crazy”, which Fraser 
claims is what Rorty’s feminist prophets amount to, is an inappro-
priate model for collectivist and political social change. She suggests 
the model of consciousness-raising as a better model. :e model of 
consciousness-raising allows us to see the ways in which semantic 
authority is constructed by communities, rather than resulting from 
an individual’s vision that catches ;re and takes on followers.
One might see in this a related trend in feminist epistemology 
and science studies, in which feminists have argued that it is com-
munities, rather than individuals, that are the primary subjects of 
knowledge.3 In this respect, Fraser’s argument can be read as en-
couraging Rorty to adopt feminist analyses of justi;cation and 
knowledge practices. Fraser argues that the feminist strategy of 
establishing a “counterpublic sphere” –that is, a public, but explicitly 
feminist sphere, including economic, social, and cultural institutions 
and informal networks– is more in line with feminist political 
ideals, and more consistent with Rorty’s emphasis on “linguistic 
communities” than the separatist movement that Rorty thinks is 
the crucible of feminist vision.
Fraser does agree with Rorty that feminist appeals to moral re-
alism and universalism are misguided, however, and that linguistic 
innovation is essential to the project of creating new moral identities 
in which feminists are engaged. She agrees that the characterization 
of feminist moral progress as a process of discovering moral truths 
that were always there for the ;nding, but merely ignored, is incor-
rect, and she, like Rorty, aligns herself with the American pragmatist 
movement in this respect. Yet, her analysis of linguistic innovation 
departs from Rorty’s, since she sees linguistic innovation as taking 
place through political struggle and solidarity-building, rather than 
seeing linguistic innovation as the engine that drives such struggle. 
:e issue between Fraser and Rorty, then, is not the relative value 
of realist or universalist appeals –on this they agree– but rather, the 
politics of linguistic innovation. :e question to which they give 
3 See, for instance, Nelson (1990) and Longino (1990).
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diJerent answers is: how does linguistic innovation work to create 
and sustain political change?
Sabina Lovibond argues that feminist linguistic innovation 
cannot –and should not– disengage itself from discourses of realism 
and universalism. Lovibond argues that Rorty’s image of linguistic 
innovation sunders ties with truth-talk and reality unnecessarily, 
with the result that such innovation can be little more than a game 
or a struggle for power. By disconnecting linguistic innovation 
from the urge to “get things right”, we fail to see the ways that the 
introduction of new terms, like ‘sexual harrassment’, is taken by 
a given community to constitute a correction of present practice, 
rather than a mere innovation.
Lovibond argues against Rorty that recognition of the intuitive 
nature of the appearance/reality distinction need not represent a 
hankering for a God’s eye view, or a position outside of history. It 
need not, that is, invoke ideas of objectivity that are underwritten 
by a metaphysics of the world as it is in and of itself, accessible only 
from “outside” of history or human perspectives.
In addition Lovibond argues that the linguistic naturalism that 
Rorty advocates does not demand that we abandon the appearance/
reality distinction. Rather, as Lovibond argues, a thoroughgoing 
naturalism about linguistic practice would seem to require such 
recognition, since, she argues, what it is to try to describe –or rede-
scribe– objects or states of aJairs is to try to say what the world is 
like regardless of whether others believe the world to be like that or 
not. :at is, implicit in every description is an appeal to the diJer-
ence between the way the world is and the way that we and others 
might think it is –this is not an invocation of metaphysical realism, 
Lovibond argues, just the way that our language works. Lovibond 
is eager to connect this not to a metaphysics of truth, but to a re-
turn of such terms as ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ to the humble realm of 
everyday speech. :e very act of assertion, Lovibond claims, must 
be understood as an invocation of absolute truth, yet, she argues, 
that invocation need not constitute a retreat to an extreme form of 
Platonism. :e concept of absolute truth, and the related distinction 
between the real as opposed to the merely apparent are, in essence, 
just part of what it is to make an assertion, a conclusion that we can 
arrive at simply by examining our linguistic practices.
In essence, Lovibond’s charge against Rorty is that he remains 
a philosopher, unwilling to take up the “humble” standpoint of a 
user of language, from which the appearance/reality distinction 
is not metaphysical, but is rather just part of what it is to make an 
assertion. And from the humble perspective of the everyday user of 
a language, linguistic innovation is not merely a struggle for logi-
cal space; it is an attempt to get things right, to introduce terms 
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and concepts that more aptly capture the way things are, and to 
get others to see that this is a better description because it moves 
us closer to a true account of the world. By insisting on looking 
at linguistic behavior “from the side”, as an anthropologist might 
observe a foreign culture, trying to track its rules of use without 
committing herself to those rules, Rorty cannot see the naturalistic 
grounding of truth claims in the appearance/reality distinction as 
anything other than Platonism run amok. By characterizing lin-
guistic innovation from this side-on perspective, Rorty takes up the 
position of the consummate philosopher, seeking objectivity and 
detachment from the practices of assertion that mark the “humble” 
perspective of the user of those assertions.
In addition to taking issue with Rorty’s critique of realism and 
the appearance/reality distinction, Lovibond also criticizes Rorty’s 
failure to see that universalism and the project of legitimation go 
hand in hand for feminism. Rorty thinks that this universalism 
must take the form of an appeal to a transcendent law giver, and 
as such it ought to be abandoned. Lovibond disagrees; she argues 
that we may instead understand universalism as recognition of the 
Kantian demand of universality in our political lives. We can recog-
nize universalism as an attempt to impose constraints on our own 
and others’ exercises of power by recognizing, and imposing upon 
ourselves, a moral ideal of egalitarianism. Lovibond argues that 
feminism is importantly understood both as a species of universal-
ism, and as part of the secular modernist project, because it seeks 
legitimation of its demands not in a transcendent law giver, but in a 
fully secular moral order. Rorty characterizes feminism as a kind of 
“political lobby”, Lovibond argues, which means that he misses the 
fact that its goals are expressed not as mere preferences, but as mor-
ally coercive grounds for changing patriarchal social arrangements. 
In a similar vein, Lovibond takes issue with Rorty’s attempt to iden-
tify feminist politics with the project of inventing a new identity 
for women as women. Like Fraser, Lovibond argues that Rorty’s 
characterization of the feminist project is insuQciently attentive to 
the goal of changing political structures and political life, but unlike 
Fraser, Lovibond argues that a universalist politics, grounded in a dis-
course of human rights, is the appropriate justi;cation for this project. 
Moreover, Lovibond argues, there are no resources in Rorty’s pragma-
tism to distinguish between the moral identity of women oJered by 
conservative anti-feminists, and that oJered by feminists. :e model 
of prophecy and the feminist as prophet is objectionable, according to 
Fraser, because of its individualistic commitments; Lovibond objects 
that Rorty has missed the way that prophecy depends upon realism, 
and the appearance/reality distinction to constitute itself.
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In his essay, “Hope, Truth and Rhetoric: Prophecy and Pragmatism 
in Service of Feminism’s Cause” (forthcoming in the volume), 
Adams oJers a defense of Rorty’s use of the prophetic voice as a way 
of understanding language that has yet to ;nd its hearers, and as, in 
some ways, consistent with Lovibond’s claim that what it is to make 
assertions is to invoke “truth absolute”. Adams emphasizes the fact 
that prophets are generally rhetorical failures in their own time; 
their imagined audience is a future audience, and their rhetorical 
eJectiveness can only be measured in some later time, when their 
claims about the truth are taken up as grounds for action. Adams 
argues that both feminism and philosophy itself should be under-
stood as rhetorical exercises. While the prophetic voice might be 
the rhetorically ineJective voice during its time, it is most eJective 
in keeping hope alive, and in projecting an image of the future that 
can serve as a ground for organizing. But Adams also argues, contra 
Lovibond, that the idea of truths that are true regardless of whether 
others take them to be so can only be made viable and judged, in 
retrospect, to have always been true, in virtue of rhetorical inter-
ventions. :e truth does not speak for itself, he contends, and even 
philosophers have need of rhetoric.
Adams argues that rhetoric is a key cultural practice that 
enables both social change and the constitution and continued 
re-invigoration of communities that share a set of political ideals. 
He thus elaborates on the way that rhetoric supports and enables 
the kind of explicitly political solidarity to which both Fraser and 
Lovibond refer, and which they argue is insuQciently represented 
in Rorty’s vision of the prophetic feminist. But, like Rorty, Adams 
argues for the blurring of the distinction between philosophy and 
other kinds of cultural practices and literatures. In so doing, Adams 
argues that philosophy traditionally conceived has tried to separate 
itself from the practices of persuasion, and has sought to mask its 
own rhetorical eJectiveness. :us, feminist philosophers who hew 
to the traditional distinction between philosophy and rhetoric are 
guilty of a certain kind of dishonesty, failing to recognize the ways in 
which constructions of truth are sometimes stand-ins for rhetorical 
eJectiveness.
What I came to see is that Rorty’s attempt to undermine the 
distinction between ‘representational’ discourses (the sciences, 
philosophy, metaethics) and ‘non-representational’ discourses (e.g. 
;ction, poetry, rhetoric) exempli;ed in his valorizaton of ‘proph-
ecy’ over philosophy is in part motivated by a distrust of appeals 
to truth –not by a skepticism about truth. While it is clear that 
some part of this seems to be strategic –he thinks that appeals to 
truth aren’t rhetorically ineJective– this stand seems to have given 
way, in his later works, to worries about the invocation of ‘truth’. 
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In Nietzschean style, Rorty’s late works show a philosopher who 
seems to see lurking in appeals to truth a hankering aFer a divine 
grounding for our claims –a hankering that Rorty diagnoses as an 
unhealthy theological urge. He worries that in the attempt to re-
suscitate ‘truth’ we are smuggling in a hankering aFer ‘Truth’ and 
with it a desire to be accountable to something outside the human 
realm; something ‘super’ natural –whether it is god or the brute 
givenness of reality.
In feminist attempts to ground political claims in realism, Rorty 
thinks that we are in danger of returning to our religious impulses, 
and that this, above all, is the urge we need to resist. Political life 
and the discourses that it gives rise to and, in turn, feeds oJ of, is 
best conducted in secular terms. :is, I think, is Rorty’s ultimate 
message to feminists. And if we take feminist philosophy to be yet 
another aspect of philosophy traditionally conceived, we would be 
better getting over that. Yet, if philosophy is de;ned by its canon, 
then it is equally diQcult for feminists to locate ourselves in the 
discipline since the feminist philosophical canon overlaps with, but 
is not identical with, the traditional canon.
:e turn to MacKinnon, Frye, and Rich might have been a mat-
ter of chance and omnivorous reading habits, but in so doing, Rorty 
points out this important tension at the heart of the issue of femi-
nist philosophy: what is it that one is doing when one takes oneself 
to be doing feminist philosophy, or teaching feminist philosophy? If, 
as Rorty seems to imply, one could just replace the term ‘philosophy’ 
with the word ‘politics’ in the phrase ‘feminist philosophy’ why 
does that make many feminist philosophers squirm?
:e answer is, I think, that insofar as we take philosophy to be 
something other than politics by another name –where politics is 
understood as the realm of the exercise of power– we ;nd it diQcult 
to give up the term ‘feminist philosophy’ in favor of simply calling 
what we’re doing ‘feminist politics’; yet, insofar as persuasion re-
mains an important part of feminist philosophy –or of philosophy 
in general– then it is hard to avoid the conclusion that feminist phi-
losophy and philosophy in general are not instances of the exercise 
of power, since persuasion is itself a type of power. We might want 
to say that as philosophers we are committed to a particular model 
of appropriate grounds for persuasion, and to this, Rorty asks: and 
what would those grounds be? :is seems to be where he leaves us 
–with another rhetorical question.
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